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Abstract. We describe a new form of online tracking: explicit, yet unnecessary leakage 
of personal information and detailed shopping habits from online merchants to payment 
providers. In contrast to Web tracking, online shops make it impossible for their cus-
tomers to avoid this proliferation of their data. We record and analyse leakage patterns 
for N=881 US Web shops sampled from Web users’ actual online purchase sessions. 
More than half of the sites shared product names and details with PayPal, allowing the 
payment provider to build up comprehensive consumption profiles across the sites con-
sumers buy from, subscribe to, or donate to. In addition, PayPal forwards customers’ 
shopping details to Omniture, a third-party data aggregator with an even larger tracking 
reach. Leakage to PayPal is commonplace across product categories and includes de-
tails of medication or sex toys. We provide recommendations for merchants. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Online payment providers process rich transaction data 
Online payment handling is a key enabler for electronic and mobile retailing, and a 
growing business opportunity. Payment providers are intermediaries between mer-
chants and their customers who buy and then pay for goods and services. As interme-
diaries, payment providers necessarily gain insight into the transaction, as they process 
personal information, just like the delivery company will need the customer’s postal 
address. The minimum data requirements for payment handling are the order total, the 
receiving merchant and an authenticated payment method. This corresponds to data 
items traditionally collected during credit card transactions. However, a much richer set 
of data items becomes available for online purchases, including an itemised bill or in-
formation about the buyer, allowing for value-added services. These data are valuable 
for payment providers and merchants who can benefit from lower fees. 
1.2 Privacy concerns and the principle of data minimisation 
The large-scale collection and processing of personal details causes privacy concerns. 
Concern is no longer limited to traditional items of personal information like address 
or demographics, but increasingly about consumption behaviour. Of particular interest 
is shopping data, whose value is demonstrated through myriads of loyalty card schemes. 
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Purchase tracking now happens across channels (online / offline) and even if users are 
not enrolled in a loyalty scheme [1], [2]. 
Our research motivation is the ability of payment providers to collect purchase de-
tails at scale. Similar to Web tracking and analytics, a small number of providers cover 
multiple Websites (merchants) and can link transactions across those. Compared to 
cookie-like tracking, the privacy issues are exacerbated:  
─ Embedded tracking code is—in principle—ancillary to the core functionality of the 
Web page and can safely be filtered out (e.g., with ad-blockers). Payment handling 
is however essential to shopping, and users cannot complete the transaction without 
interacting with the payment provider. 
─ Unlike browsing patterns linked to a cookie identifier, consumption patterns linked 
to a payment method are not pseudonymous but identifiable through offline details 
such as credit card numbers or bank account details, which often include full name. 
─ Payment cards or account information serve as persistent identifiers, allowing the 
linkage of multiple transactions even across different logins or accounts. 
─ Consumers are typically unable to evade such data collection unless they refrain 
from shopping with the given merchant. The collection of shoppers’ details is a neg-
ative externality of the contract between the merchant and the payment provider. 
─ Payment handling is universal across merchants and sectors. Consumer details are 
collected and merged across transactions even for sensitive products and merchants. 
This includes pharmacies or adult entertainment, for instance, where shoppers delib-
erately moved out of the high street and onto the Web in a pursuit of privacy. 
Privacy threats arise from detailed purchase patterns when more than the minimum data 
required are collected. Although the principle of data minimisation has long been cod-
ified in national law and international privacy guidelines (e.g., by the OECD [3]), it is 
only with the European Union’s upcoming General Data Protection Regulation, that 
data minimisation is becoming an enforceable principle [4]. 
1.3 Research questions and our contribution 
Ahead of tightening regulation regarding data minimisation, recognising that online 
payment handling is a growing market, we set out to explore the tracking capabilities 
of online payment providers.  
We conducted the first industry-wide, empirical survey that quantifies the flows of 
customer data from N=881 merchants to PayPal. We describe current practices of data 
proliferation which can soon be deemed privacy leaks. PayPal is chosen as the most 
pervasive online payment provider, covering Websites across strata of popularity [5]. 
We investigate which personal and transactions details merchants are sharing with Pay-
Pal above pure order totals (Fig. 1). Our survey of the ecosystem also looks for per-
sector differences in data sharing with payment providers or whether more popular 
Websites leak more or less personal details. 
2 Related work 
Our investigation complements and expands an existing body of literature that has em-
pirically examined privacy and tracking practices at large. Bonneau and Preibusch stud-
ied privacy practices across the entire online social networking ecosystem and found 
unsatisfactory privacy practices across the industry [6]. They also investigated data pro-
tection practices across different industries [7] and found that poor practices were com-
monplace regarding password security, although merchant sites did better than news-
paper sites. Specifically for Web shops, more expensive shops were found to collect 
significantly more personal details than their cheaper competitors [8]. 
A number of Web privacy surveys studied the private information leakage, different 
tracking mechanisms and their prevalence on the Web. Krishnamurthy and Wills show 
how personally identifiable information leaks via online social networks, including the 
leakage by HTTP Referer header [9]. Other researchers surveyed the use of more ad-
vanced and resilient tracking mechanisms such as evercookies [10], [11], [12], browser 
fingerprinting [12], [13], [14] and cookie syncing [12], commonly reporting on ques-
tionable practices and unexpected prevalence of such technologies. 
Finally, researchers looked into consumers’ privacy choices in online shopping. 
Buyers of sensitive products (vibrators) were found to pay a premium to shop with a 
retailer whose privacy practices were labelled as superior by a product search engine 
[15]. In the largest ever lab and field experiment in privacy economics, almost one in 
three Web shoppers paid one euro extra for keeping their mobile phone number private 
[16]. When privacy comes for free, more than 80% of consumers choose the company 
that collects less personal information [16]. Earlier results indicated that price discounts 
override online shoppers’ privacy preferences [17]. 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Background: PayPal integration, information flows, privacy agreements 
PayPal has been a pioneer to offer payment acceptance to electronic retailers, albeit its 
product range now covers a plenitude of card and card-less payment and identity ser-
vices for online, offline, and mobile transactions. Similar to a cloud service, PayPal’s 
offerings are characterised by their ease of set-up, pay per use, and self-service. 
PayPal offers multiple ways to be embedded in the shopping workflow, traditionally 
depending on the type of payment [18]. On a technical level, there are two different 
integration routes depending on how the session data is transmitted from the merchant 
to PayPal: (1) server-to-server integration, where SOAP Web services or REST APIs 
are used to communicate transaction details from the merchant to PayPal; (2) integra-
tion via the client, where transaction parameters are passed exclusively through the 
query string (GET) by means of buyers’ browsers. 
Integration via GET is simple and readily available for hosted Websites, as no server-
side communication is required (“buttons” in PayPal parlance). More sophisticated 
methods use server-to-server communication between the application server and the 
payment provider: the merchant creates a session with the payment provider when sub-
mitting all relevant transaction data. This session is then referenced through a session 
identifier or token (“EC token”), which is the only information that the client needs to 
pass on [19]. This method requires more technical expertise, but is less susceptible to 
manipulation by the client. However, server-to-server communication cannot be ob-
served in a study like ours, where the client is instrumented. 
Payment sessions referenced via an EC token are very common. The unobservable 
flow of personal information between servers is a challenge for our research. We there-
fore use personal data that PayPal displays back to the user to establish a lower bound 
for the privacy invasion by the data that is transmitted (Section 3.3). 
The “Legal Agreements for PayPal Services” [20] outline a number of requirements 
for merchants. All information submitted to the API must be “true, correct, and com-
plete” [21]. Whereas all fields containing personal information are optional [22], a “de-
scription field to identify the goods” and a URL linking back to the original product 
page must be provided for the popular Express Checkout method [22]. 
3.2 Sampling 
We sample online shops that target US consumers and provide checkout in US Dollar 
via PayPal. The US market is chosen for its size and for being the home market of 
PayPal. We sample popular Web shops from real online shopping sessions, seeded from 
Internet Explorer users who opted in to share their browsing history. Practices at these 
popular online destinations impact a large consumer population. Stores are identified 
by their URL, as occurring before the PayPal checkout page in browser sessions. For 
each URL, we selected a single product for purchase, following a strict procedure. 
We excluded Websites offering business services (B2B such as email marketing 
campaigns), banks and insurances, and restricted Websites which required a prior cus-
tomer relationship such as utility companies. Airline Websites were often excluded for 
we were unable to complete the purchase according to our data collection protocol. 
EBay, PayPal internal and duplicate Websites were excluded. 
Hosting sites (e.g., Yahoo! shops or Google Sites) were excluded and separated from 
the sample for future analysis. Such sites host multiple shops with differing implemen-
tation practices under a single domain. A few representative sub-shops were chosen for 
affiliate shops (e.g., spreadshirt.com) and shop-in-shop solutions (e.g., atgstores.com).  
3.3 Experimental protocol 
For reliable results, a strict data collection protocol was followed during the main 
data collection, after a pilot study on 40 Websites. The details of the experimental setup 
and procedures are laid out in the Online Companion. To avoid contamination of the 
results by residual cookies or other re-identification methods, a virtual machine was 
used and reset for every recording anew. Transaction data were recorded while navi-
gating from the product page to PayPal’s checkout screen. Browsing was done in Fire-
fox and all HTTP and HTTPS traffic was captured by mitmproxy [23] and stored. This 
includes GET and POST requests and the parameters submitted with them. Web forms 
were completed by using the same fictitious profile data on every site, a woman in her 
40s living in a major US city. A unique email address was used for each Website. Alt-
hough data collection was tool-supported, there was always a human in the loop. 
4 Data analysis 
4.1 Data description  
 Dataset. From an initial list of 1200 extracted from browsing sessions, we successfully 
collected data for N=881 merchant Websites: HTTP(S) traffic traces until reaching the 
PayPal login page, and screenshot upon arrival. The parsed logs and transcribed screen-
shots constitute all evidence of personal identifiable information (PII) leakage a cus-
tomer can capture. More than 86% of all Websites use a token implementation; we rely 
on the screenshots for those as PII leakage cannot be inferred from the client logs. 
To verify our screenshot-based approach, we checked whether the PayPal screen 
always displays all PII received over the GET query-string. We were able to confirm 
that whenever customer or product data was leaked via GET, it showed up on the Pay-
Pal login screen. The only exception was for shipping costs of USD 0.00, which was 
forwarded but hidden in 36 cases. 
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C1 391 (44%)               0 0 
  Leaks nothing. 
C2 34 (4%) □ □     □ □ □ □   1 3 
  Usually leaks two of names, item numbers, and prices. 
C3 292 (33%)           □ □ □ □ 3 4 
  Leaks at least names, item numbers, and prices. 
C4 155 (18%)         ■ □ ■ □ □ 4 5 
  Leaks at least most product details and always shipping costs. 
C5☠ 9 (1%) ■ ■ □   □ □ ■ □ □ 6 7 
  Leaks name and address in addition to product details. 
Table 1. Leaked data by clusters ranked from good to bad privacy practices. The common leak-
age of product details is more worrying than the seeming absence of customer data: PayPal col-
lects identity details directly during payment. Leaked: □ = sometimes, ■ = always, blank = never  
Clustering of leakage patterns. The leakage patterns form the backbone of our work. 
To analyse the data more deeply, we reduce the number of distinct patterns by cluster-
ing all 881 URLs into only few classes (Table 1). We use EM clustering [24], which 
automatically determines the appropriate number of clusters.  
A natural question is whether a particular combination of endpoint and token usage 
enforces or prevents leakage. Analysing the clusters with association rule mining indi-
cates no such relationship: None of the clusters are homogeneous with respect to end-
points and tokens, except for C2, which does not contain any token implementations. 
Privacy-friendly Websites tend to use a token more often: 98% of all Websites in 
Cluster C1 were using a token, compared to 86% and 85% for C3 and C4, respectively 
(p < 0.0001, two-tailed Fisher’s exact test). 
We observe that no Websites leaking customer addresses rely on a token implemen-
tation. With a sample size of nine this holds little statistical significance, but we found 
no indication in the API documentation that this is a requirement on PayPal’s side. We 
conclude that PayPal’s available API methods do not bias Web shops to treat custom-
ers’ privacy in a specific way. 
4.2 Adding Alexa metadata: Website popularity and quality 
We investigated whether Website popularity and technical quality had an influence on 
privacy-friendliness. We use the Alexa Web Information Service (AWIS) features 
‘speed percentile’ and ‘traffic rank’ as proxies. Speed percentile has no immediate bear-
ing on cluster membership. Rather, we see that the number of sites from a certain cluster 
scale with the overall number of sites in the speed percentile. We further see that the 
distribution of sites from the clusters over the percentile bins follow no specific pattern. 
It can thus not be said that the speed of a Website has a positive correlation with its 
privacy-friendliness. 
Less popular sites are found significantly more often in clusters that exhibit more 
leakage. More popular sites tend to leak less. For illustrative purposes, the average 
traffic rank is 0.4m for C1, 1.0m for C3 and 1.4m for C4. A Mann-Whitney U test 
indicates a highly significant difference in the traffic ranks per cluster (p = 0.001 for 
both pairwise comparisons). Sites in the worst leakage C5 do not appear among the 50 
highest ranked in our sample. 
4.3 Third-party tracking facilitated by PayPal, and internal persistent cookies 
Analysis of the HTTP traffic observed during the experiments revealed the use of 
Adobe’s Omniture tracking software on PayPal checkout pages. When a user lands on 
the PayPal checkout page, two HTTP requests were sent to paypal.d1.sc.omtrdc.net and 
paypal.112.2o7.net, which both belong to Omniture [25]. The requests contain 
metadata about the payment to be made, such as currency and transaction token, along 
with the user’s browser characteristics such as plugins, screen dimensions and software 
versions [26]. Remarkably, PayPal also shares the Referer URL of the checkout page, 
which reveals the URL of the Web shop, and potentially the product to be purchased. 
The transfer of these details enables Adobe to build a better profile of 152 million Pay-
Pal users [5], by combining payment details with other online activities recorded on 
more than 300,000 Omniture-tracked Websites [27], which notably includes 50 of the 
Web shops analysed in this study. 
Note that the leakage described here is different from the indirect information leak-
age via Referer headers as studied in [28], since the PayPal checkout page actively 
collects and sends the Referer of the checkout page, which would not be shared other-
wise with the Omniture domains. Furthermore, by sending high-entropy browser prop-
erties such as plugins and screen dimensions, PayPal make it possible for Omniture to 
track users by their browser fingerprints even if they block cookies or use private 
browsing mode [13]. 
According to its privacy policy, PayPal may share customers’ personal information 
with third-party service providers [29] who are limited to use PayPal customers’ infor-
mation “in connection with the services they perform for [PayPal].” Assuming the in-
formation shared with Omniture is subject to a similar agreement, it is hard to make 
sure whether payment information, product URL or browser characteristics are inter-
preted as personal information or not, given the possible interpretations of the policy 
and lack of transparency around PayPal's contracts with third-parties. 
As of September 14th, 2014, long after we finished with the experiments, the PayPal 
checkout page no longer references a third-party tracker, though Omniture is still used 
on the PayPal homepage. 
PayPal still deploys two questionable, internal tracking mechanisms: evercookies 
and browser fingerprinting. Although these techniques may be helpful in preventing 
account hijacking or similar fraudulent activities, their use is not mentioned explicitly 
in PayPal’s privacy policy. These tracking techniques are difficult to avoid for users 
and have led to lawsuits and multi-million dollar settlements in the past [30]. 
5 Limitations 
As outlined in Section 2, our sampling strategy combined Web shop URLs from differ-
ent sources to cover both larger and smaller merchants. We expect our dataset to contain 
an equal distribution over more and less professional Websites, as well as more and less 
frequented ones. 
This comes at the price of diversity of goods that are sold. It easily observed that 
there are more Web shops selling physical goods than there are commercial dating 
Websites, for instance. This makes statistically significant statements about differing 
privacy practices hard, if not impossible. 
For obvious reasons, our data collection setup could not cover server-to-server com-
munication, which, according to PayPal documentation [18], can be used by merchants 
to communicate with PayPal. Also, in our experiments we did not go beyond the PayPal 
checkout page to complete the payments. As a result, the data collected and leaked after 
the PayPal checkout page is not covered in our analysis. 
6 Conclusion and discussion 
We presented a new species in the zoo of online tracking systems: explicit leakage of 
personal information and detailed shopping habits from online merchants to payment 
providers. In contrast to the widely debated tracking of Web browsing, online shops 
make it impossible for their customers to avoid this proliferation of their data.  
By mediating online payments between merchants and buyers, payment providers 
are in a position to access sensitive payment details that can be used to build a detailed 
profile of shopping habits. Being the most popular payment provider, PayPal learns 
how much money its 152 million customers are spending and where. These customers 
are identified by name, email and postal address and through their bank details. We 
have demonstrated that merchant Websites are unnecessarily forwarding product de-
tails to PayPal that give a detailed view on consumers’ purchases. 
According to our analysis, 52% of the Web shops in our study shared product names, 
item numbers and descriptions with PayPal. On the other hand, the remaining 388 sites 
did not share any purchase details except the amount to be paid, confirming that sharing 
sensitive details is not necessary for electronic retailers. 
 
Fig. 1. Sites selling sensitive products also leak product details to PayPal: adult toys and medi-
cation (5-HTP addresses depression, anxiety, sleep disorders). Also see the online companion. 
Further, we reported on the PayPal’s use of the tracking service Omniture, which 
amplifies the privacy concerns by exposing transaction details to a widely deployed 
third-party tracker. A third-party tracker that has access to general Web tracking 
information, as well as to the details of successfully completed transactions, is in a 
particularly privileged situation to monitor consumption choices at large. 
Web shops that use the technically more advanced token-based integration are often 
more privacy-friendly. Also, less popular sites are significantly more often among those 
that leak more personal information. There are no systematic differences across product 
categories, meaning that all kinds of shoppers are exposed. 
By exploring the alternative privacy preserving practices that can be followed by 
Web shops, we distilled the following suggestions: (1) apply data minimization 
principle—do not leak information that is not required for processing the transaction; 
(2) inform customers about the data sharing in your privacy policy; (3) offer alternative, 
privacy-friendly payment methods; (4) use a payment gateway to prevent leakage of 
product URL via Referer header. 
Better privacy practices for handling online payments is not only desirable for end 
users, but also for the merchants and payment providers whose bussinesses depend on 
the users’ trust. At times when personal information is said to be new currency on the 
Web, it seems unfair that consumers are charged twice during checkout. 
References 
1. J. Valentino-DeVries und J. Singer-Vine, „They Know What You're Shopping For,“ 7 
December 2012. [Online]. Available: http://on.wsj.com/TQ8Dbi. 
2. C. Duhigg, „How Companies Learn Your Secrets,“ 16 February 2012. [Online]. Available: 
http://nyti.ms/QbbTyS. 
3. OECD, „The OECD Privacy Framework,“ 2013. 
4. European Commission, „Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation),“ 2012. 
5. PayPal, „About PayPal,“ 2014. [Online]. Available: https://www.paypal-media.com/about. 
6. J. Bonneau und S. Preibusch, „The Privacy Jungle: On the Market for Data Protection in 
Social Networks,“ in Eighth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS), 
2009.  
7. J. Bonneau und S. Preibusch, „The password thicket: technical and market failures in human 
authentication on the web,“ in Ninth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security 
(WEIS), 2010.  
8. S. Preibusch und J. Bonneau, „The privacy landscape: product differentiation on data 
collection,“ in Economics of Information Security and Privacy III, Springer, 2013, pp. 263--
283. 
9. B. Krishnamurthy und C. E. Wills, „On the leakage of personally identifiable information via 
online social networks,“ in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Online social networks 
(WOSN), 2009.  
10. A. Soltani, S. Canty, Q. Mayo, L. Thomas und C. J. Hoofnagle, „Flash Cookies and Privacy,“ 
in Intelligent Information Privacy Management, Papers from the 2010 AAAI Spring 
Symposium, Technical Report SS-10-05, 2010.  
11. M. Ayenson, D. J. Wambach, A. Soltani, N. Good und C. J. Hoofnagle, „Flash Cookies and 
Privacy II: Now with HTML5 and ETag Respawning,“ SSRN, 2011. 
12. G. Acar, C. Eubank, S. Englehardt, M. Juarez, A. Narayanan und C. Diaz, „The Web never 
forgets: Persistent tracking mechanisms in the wild,“ in Proceedings of CCS 2014, 2014.  
13. P. Eckersley, „How unique is your web browser?,“ in Proceedings of the 10th international 
conference on Privacy enhancing technologies (PETS), 2010.  
14. G. Acar, M. Juarez, N. Nikiforakis, C. Diaz, S. Gürses und F. a. P. B. Piessens, „FPDetective: 
Dusting the web for fingerprinters,“ in Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on 
Computer & communications security, 2013.  
15. J. Y. Tsai, S. Egelman, L. Cranor und A. Acquisti, „The Effect of Online Privacy Information 
on Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study,“ Information Systems Research, 22(2), pp. 
254--268, 2011.  
16. N. Jentzsch, S. Preibusch und A. Harasser, „Study on monetising privacy. An economic model 
for pricing personal information,“ European Network and information Security Agency 
(ENISA), 2012. 
17. S. Preibusch, D. Kübler und A. R. Beresford, „Price versus privacy: an experiment into the 
competitive advantage of collecting less personal information,“ Electronic Commerce 
Research, 13(4), pp. 423--455, 2013.  
18. PayPal, „How would you like to integrate with PayPal?,“ 2013. [Online]. Available: https://
developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/docs/. 
19. PayPal, „Getting Started With Express Checkout,“ 2013. [Online]. Available: https://
developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/docs/classic/express-checkout/integration-
guide/ECGettingStarted/. 
20. PayPal, „Legal Agreements for PayPal Services,“ 2014. [Online]. Available: https://
www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/ua/legalhub-full. 
21. PayPal, „PayPal Developer Agreement,“ 2013. [Online]. Available: https://www.paypal.com/
us/webapps/mpp/ua/xdeveloper-full. 
22. PayPal, „SetExpressCheckout API Operation (NVP),“ 2014. [Online]. Available: https://dev
eloper.paypal.com/docs/classic/api/merchant/SetExpressCheckout_API_Operation_NVP. 
23. mitmproxy project, „mitmproxy 0.9 - Introduction,“ 2013. [Online]. Available: http://
mitmproxy.org/doc/index.html. 
24. A. P. Dempster, N. M. Laird und D. B. Rubin, „Maximum Likelihood from Incomplete Data 
via the EM Algorithm,“ Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), 
39(1), pp. 1--38, 1977.  
25. Adobe Systems Incorporated, „Digital marketing | Adobe Marketing Cloud,“ 2014. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.adobe.com/solutions/digital-marketing.html. 
26. Adobe Systems Incorporated, „SiteCatalyst variables and query string parameters,“ 2014. 
[Online]. Available: http://helpx.adobe.com/analytics/using/digitalpulse-debugger.html#
id_1298. 
27. BuiltWith Pty Ltd, „Websites using Omniture SiteCatalyst,“ 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://trends.builtwith.com/websitelist/Omniture-SiteCatalyst. 
28. B. Krishnamurthy und C. Wills, „Privacy diffusion on the web: a longitudinal perspective,“ 
in Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web (WWW), 2009.  
29. PayPal, „Privacy Policy,“ 20 February 2013. [Online]. Available: https://www.paypal.com/
webapps/mpp/ua/privacy-full. 
30. R. Singel, „Online Tracking Firm Settles Suit Over Undeletable Cookies,“ 12 May 2010. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.wired.com/2010/12/zombie-cookie-settlement/. 
